



















The hypothesis that the coefficients on variables of religious affiliation are jointly equal to zero 
can frequently be rejected at conventional levels of statistical significance (i.e., religion matters), 
but no robust relationship between adherence to major world religions and national economic 
performance is uncovered, using both cross-national and subnational data. The results with 
respect to Islam do not support the notion that it is inimical to growth. On the contrary, virtually 
every statistically significant coefficient on Muslim population shares reported in this paper—in 
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Abundant evidence affirms that religious belief affects a wide range of behavioral outcomes 
(Iannaccone 1998), and religious activity can affect economic performance at the level of the 
individual, group, or nation through at least two channels. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith 
argued that participation in religious sects could potentially convey two economic advantages to 
adherents (Anderson 1988).
1 The first could be as a reputational signal: while the poor might look 
alike to potential employers, lenders, and customers, membership in a “good” sect could convey a 
reduction in risk associated with the particular individual and ultimately improve the efficient 
allocation of resources.
2 Second, sects could also provide for extra-legal means of establishing 
trust and sanctioning miscreants in intragroup transactions, again reducing uncertainty and 
improving efficiency, especially where civil remedies for failure to uphold contracts were weak.
3 
This interpretation is essentially contentless with respect to the actual nature of religious belief. 
Indeed, there is nothing necessarily unique about religious sects in this regard--the argument 
could apply to a wide range of voluntary associations or clubs. 
  A variant of this notion offered by modernization theorists such as Hoselitz (1960), 
McClelland (1961), and Hagen (1962) is that traditional societies resist change, and innovative 
groups can be important in the process of modernization. Hoselitz, in particular, argued that 
socially marginalized groups might seize on economic enrichment as a mechanism for securing 
prosperity and security. Religious affiliation could serve as the base for group cohesion necessary 
to successfully challenge established institutions and practices. For example, according to Lal 
(1998), Buddhism and Jainism played just this sort of role in ancient India.  
                                                 
1 Following Iannaccone (1998), the term religion is used to mean any shared set of beliefs, activities, and 
institutions premised upon faith in supernatural forces.  Max Weber (1906/2002) further distinguishes 
between churches, for instance Catholic or Lutheran, which are inclusive, voluntary organizations, 
characterized by formal hierarchical administration, that minister to all—damned and saved alike—who 
happen to fall under their administration, typically due to birth, and where possible seek to have their 
authority reinforced by association with the state.  In contrast, sects—and here he includes American 
Baptists, Quakers, Presbyterians, and other groups descending from Puritanism—are defined as exclusive, 
voluntary communities of the religiously qualified, governed by a network of peers, whose principal 
political demand is freedom from the state. 
2 In ‘Churches’ and ‘Sects’ in North America (1906/2002), Weber provides particularly vivid first-hand 
accounts of both of these effects in operation in turn-of-the-century America.  In other settings, Weber 
(1920/1952, 1920/1958), Lewis (1955), McClelland (1961), Hagen (1962), and Bellah (1963) make 
reference to Jews, Huguenots, Quakers, Jains, and Parsees among others.  Kennedy (1988) and Platteau 
(1994) provide numerous contemporary examples from sub-Saharan Africa. Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) 
argue that networks increase returns to educational investments, and this networking effect could further 
reinforce the economic impact of sect membership. 
3 Fafchamps (2002) provides a dissenting view, arguing that there is no empirical evidence to support the 





  Yet history is also littered with close-knit minority groups that did not prosper. 
McClelland (1961), for example, observes that Gypsies or Roma were subject to similar 
discrimination as Jews in Europe but did not counter-strive by prospering in business. Institutions 
are endogenous and presumably arise out of shared values and the constraints imposed by the 
external environment. In a second line of argumentation, most prominently associated with Max 
Weber, it is the content of religious belief that is essential.
4 In The Protestant Ethic and the 
‘Spirit’ of Capitalism, Weber (1905/2002) contended that the Protestant Reformation was critical 
to the rise of capitalism through its impact on belief systems. The starting point of Weber’s 
analysis was “the ethical discrepancy between religious values and the given world” (Yang 1964). 
From this, religions could be classified according to their acceptance or rejection of the world; if 
acceptance, the presence or absence of tension toward the world and whether they fostered an 
orientation of transformation, adaptation, or escape from the given world. 
Weber argued that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and the associated notion of 
the “calling” were essential for transforming attitudes toward economic activity and wealth 
accumulation.
5 In John Calvin’s view, individuals were predestined to salvation or damnation, 
and “good works” were a means of self-assurance and demonstration to others of one’s fate. Each 
had a “calling,” and the successful completion of this religious mission on a daily basis was 
pleasing to God and a mark of His blessing. In contrast to Catholicism’s glorification of 
monasticism, this conception projected economic activity into the center of religious life and 
replaced the Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, and release, followed by more sin, with 
a cumulative notion of moral life. The result was a “this-worldly asceticism,” which focused 
adherents on diligent, efficient economic activity, thrift, and non-ostentatious accumulation of 
wealth, which he saw as the bedrock of modern capitalism. This development was not 
predetermined—Weber was explicit that the development of ideas and institutions congenial to 
capitalism was endogenous, path-dependent, and not determined by any iron laws of history.
6  
  Such an extraordinary thesis was sure to attract critics, and it did. Weber stands accused 
of mischaracterizing Protestant theology, misinterpreting Catholicism, ignoring nonreligious 
                                                 
4 See also Fanfani (1935/1984). 
5 Weber sees John Calvin, George Fox, John Wesley, and other radical dissenters, not Martin Luther, as the 
true sources of the Protestant Reformation.  He went so far as to posit in the theological doctrines the 
affinities of different sects to different occupations (i.e., Calvinists make good entrepreneurs; Pietists good 
clerks).  Ekelund, Hébert, and Tollison (2002) essentially turn Weber’s story on its head arguing that the 
underlying economics of Western Europe and the behavior of the Catholic Church in effect created market 
space for new entrants to whom individuals rationally switched allegiances. 
6 Eisenstadt (1968) subsequently proposed a weaker version of the thesis―that it was not the specific 
theology per se but rather the “transformative potential” of religion that could account for wholesale 





sources of intellectual ferment, misunderstanding the economic antecedents of industrial 
capitalism, thoroughly confusing the historical record with respect to the rise of capitalism in 
Catholic and Protestant communities in Western Europe, and even mishandling the statistical data 
he had at his disposal.
7 It is fair to say that today no one (with the possible exception of Landes 
[1998]) accepts Weber’s thesis at face value. Blum and Dudley (2001) provide the most 
sophisticated version of the Weber thesis, arguing that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination (in 
contradistinction to the Catholic practice of ritual penance), in game-theoretic terms, increased 
the cost of contractual defection (i.e., breaking contracts was a bigger deal for Protestants). This 
Protestant reluctance to break contracts contributed to greater trust and willingness to honor 
contracts with strangers and thereby contributed to the spread of more extensive information 
networks in the Protestant lands of Northern Europe, and it was these network externalities that 
promoted growth and the rise of industrial capitalism.  
  These two lines of reasoning―religion as a club and as a molder of behavior—merge in 
a fascinating paper by Greif (1994) who analyzes the 11th century competition between Maghribi 
traders (North African Jewish traders who had adopted the values of Muslim society) and the 
Genoese merchants. 
Greif demonstrates that the Maghribi displayed the reputational and intragroup cohesion 
associated with religious sects. The Genoese cultural innovations included formal contracts, 
courts to provide for their enforcement, the family firm (as distinct from an individual trader), and 
ultimately the joint stock company and associated accounting innovations. These organizational 
innovations were more efficient than the Maghribi methods, and as technological and political 
changes expanded the geographic scope of markets beyond the Mediterranean, the Genoese 
captured these new opportunities. Eventually the Maghribi disappeared as a distinct community, 
being absorbed into the existing Egyptian Jewish community. 
Greif asserts that the contrast between the cultural innovation of the Genoese on the one 
hand and the unwillingness or inability of the Maghribi to adapt on the other stemmed from 
cultural differences between the Genoese individualist society of the Latinate and the Maghribi 
communalist or collectivist society of the Muslim world.
8 He then goes on to associate the 
                                                 
7 See Tawney (1926/1964), Samuelsson (1961), Eisenstadt (1968), Giddens (1976), Furnham (1990), 
Kaufmann (1997), and Iannaccone (1998).  The argument by Greif (1994) outlined below and supporting 
evidence from Kaufmann (1997) suggest that fundamental economic and social innovations were occurring 
in Europe centuries before the Reformation. Lal (1998) reaches the same conclusion through a different 
route, emphasizing changes in family law under Pope Gregory I and the establishment of modern legal 
institutions under Pope Gregory VII. 
8 Greif (1994) and others use the term “collectivist” to describe societies characterized by a social order in 





individualistic Genoese with today’s successful developed countries and the communalist 
Maghribi with today’s less successful developing countries.
9 This argument just pushes the 
question back one step further: From where did these differing belief systems originate? 
Until recently, economists have paid little attention to this issue; future Nobel Laureate 
W. Arthur Lewis, one of the few who did, expressed skepticism that religious beliefs had any 
significant impact on economic behavior and indeed argued that the causality probably ran the 
other direction: Despite religion’s claim to be the ultimate primal, changes in economic 
circumstances spurred theological adaptation (Lewis 1955). In this regard, Lewis, in asserting the 
primacy of economics over religion, followed the common practice of elevating one’s own 
scholastic specialty to the primal; Hofstede, a sociologist, wrote “Religious affiliation by itself is 
less culturally relevant than is often assumed if we trace the religious histories of countries, then 
the religion a population has embraced along with the version of that religion seem to have been a 
result of previously existing cultural value patterns as much as a cause of cultural differences” 
(Hofstede 1997, 16; emphasis in the original). This conundrum—how to sort out the pattern of 
causality among economics, culture, and religious belief—is a central challenge. 
This paper is an attempt to empirically analyze the second line of argumentation, 
recognizing per Greif that intermediating institutions may be the mechanism through which 
religious belief affects economic performance at the aggregate level. The paper first reviews the 
line of reasoning initiated by Weber that the specific content of religious beliefs may profoundly 
affect economic behavior. It then examines efforts undertaken primarily by psychologists and 
sociologists to quantitatively score national cultural tendencies. In the fourth section, data on 
religious affiliation, national culture, and economic performance are analyzed at the cross-
national level. Since considerable recent commentary has focused on the alleged impact of Islam, 
specifically on economic performance, this issue is addressed in the fifth section, both cross-
                                                                                                                                                 
group, with social and economic interactions governed by ascriptive norms subject to enforcement through 
intragroup sanctions; relations with members of out-groups are circumscribed and noncooperative.  Group 
cohesion is highly valued.  As Kuran (1997) observes, these social relations might better be described as 
“communalist” with the term “collectivist” reserved for moralities that assign an important role to the state.  
The social structure of “individualist” societies is characterized by extensive interaction among members of 
different groups, with individuals identifying with, and switching among, multiple groups.  Economic 
interaction is governed by formal contracts enforceable through specialized organizations.  Self-reliance is 
highly valued.  See also Triandis (1995) and Hofstede (1997, 2001).   
9 Kennedy’s description of the practices of Hausa merchants in West Africa is remarkably similar to Greif’s 
depiction of the Maghribi.  Likewise, after documenting their remarkable intermediation of trade 
throughout West Africa, Kennedy observes “of course, it is possible that these very systems of customary 
support which have underpinned contractual relations so successfully may increasingly inhibit the 





nationally and at the subnational level, using data from three multi-religious, multi-ethnic 
countries—India, Malaysia, and Ghana—located in three different areas of the world.  
To preview the conclusions elaborated in the final section of the paper, the sociological 
and psychological analyses of the impact of religion on economic performance are indeterminate. 
Empirically, variables used to quantify national cultures are correlated with measures of religious 
affiliation and/or intensity of belief (i.e., they measure something), though they have no 
predictive power with respect to national economic performance.  
In contrast, in regressions on economic performance, the hypothesis that the coefficients 
on variables of religious affiliation are jointly equal to zero can frequently be rejected at 
conventional levels of statistical significance (i.e., religion matters), but like Barro and McCleary 
(2002), no robust relationship between adherence to major world religions and national economic 
performance is uncovered. Perhaps it should not be surprising that something as durable as 
religious affiliation is only a weak explanator of something as variable as macroeconomic 
performance.  
The economic performance of predominately Muslim countries is unremarkable once 
conventional economic fundamentals are taken into account, and the statistical modeling does not 
support the notion that Islam is inimical to growth. On the contrary, with one exception, every 
statistically significant coefficient on Muslim population shares reported in this paper—in both 
cross-country and within-country statistical analyses—is positive. If anything, Islam promotes 
growth. 
 
RELIGION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Weber completed works on Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism; his essays on ancient 
Judaism were largely complete at the time of his death in 1920; work on Islam was planned but 
not completed. Weber worked from the particular (the rise of capitalism in Europe) to the general, 
and this intellectual trajectory informed his views of the non-Christian world. Since the rise of 
capitalism was not historically given, the obvious issue for Weber to explain was why it first 
developed among Protestants in Europe and North America. 
Weber himself was a Protestant and was writing from a Germany that included three 
main religious groups: Lutherans, Catholics, and Jews. His topic was the rise of industrial 
capitalism that occurred initially in Britain, continental Europe, and North America—not its 
adoption in other regions. Yet, three aspects of Weber’s argument—namely that ascetic Puritans 
were the vanguard of a material revolution, that many other religions besides Protestant sects 





Europe and North America—provide a link to a broader consideration of theology, institutions, 
and economic performance. 
With regard to Judaism, theologically the most closely linked to Protestantism among the 
major non-Christian religions, Weber ascribed the economic success of Western European Jewry 
as a particular historical phenomenon derived from their status as a “pariah”—or in the less 
value-laden phrase of Park (1950), “marginal”—minority group along the lines first articulated by 
Adam Smith. While Judaism promoted rationality and mastery of the world, in contrast to radical 
Protestantism, economic success could not be interpreted as a signal of piety, which in Judaism 
was demonstrated through other means. Weber substantiates his argument by observing that 
Southern and Eastern Europe and the “Orient,” where the Jewish presence was the largest and 
longest, failed to develop modern capitalism (Weber 1920/1952). 
Confucianism, in Weber’s view, was “this-worldly,” but its promotion of harmonious 
relations along prescribed patterns was antithetical to the “creative destruction” of capitalism, to 
use Schumpeter’s later-used phrase, and its codification of ethical rather than formal legal 
procedure inhibited the development of capitalist commercial relations.
10 In Weber’s words, 
“Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational 
mastery of the world” (Weber 1920/1964, 248). While a Puritan could live “‘in’ the world and not 
be part ‘of’ it,” the Confucian ideal was to live “in” the world as a well-adjusted part of it (Weber 
1920/1964, 248).
11 Of course, Confucius made a great comeback in the “Asian values” debate, 
albeit with a long lag (cf. Kahn 1979).
12 
Weber argued that while Hinduism and Buddhism promoted asceticism, it was an “other-
worldly” or “world-rejecting” asceticism that upheld escape from, not mastery over, the material 
world.
 13 The emphasis on ritual law in Hinduism acted as an impediment to technical or social 
innovation from within and even hampered local adaptations of foreign innovations, and Weber 
                                                 
10 Some contemporary research into the impact of legal traditions on financial development and growth 
could be interpreted as providing support to Weber’s contention (Mahoney 2001; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Levine 2002). 
11 Weber argued that Taoism, the leading heterodoxy in China, could not play an “oppositionist” role to the 
dominant Confucian orthodoxy, analogous to radical Protestantism, because its “other-worldly” mysticism, 
toleration of magic, and encouragement of inaction, made it uniquely unsuited to spur the kind of rationalist 
revolution that occurred in Europe.  Weber ascribes the failure of China to develop rational institutions 
beyond the “fetters of the kinship group” to the absence of a universalist ethical religion such as the 
Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Weber 1920/1964, 237).   
12 Hofstede and Bond (1988) scored cross-national survey data for a “Confucian dynamism” or long-term 
orientation scale.  The variable is statistically significantly correlated with growth during the period 1965–
85.  Lal (1998) ascribes this to Sinic family structures. This will be taken up further in the next section.  
13 As in the case of the other religions, the discussion presumes that there is enough of an essential belief 
system in Hinduism to usefully discuss Hindu values shaping social behavior. Morris (1967) persuasively 
argues that there is not, particularly in past history, when the precolonial subcontinent was characterized by 





went so far as to argue that Hinduism’s assimilative powers were so great that they negatively 
impacted even non-Hindu regions of South Asia (Weber 1920/1958).
14  
Subsequent commentators have developed a more nuanced analysis noting the absence of 
a single canonical text and the existence of scriptural writings reflecting disparate attitudes 
toward economic activity and the divergence between written texts and actual practices (cf. Pieris 
1963, Uppal 1986). Eisenstadt argues that the uniqueness of Hinduism (especially in contrast to 
Islam) is that it has maintained its “identity without being tied to a given political framework”—
presumably an asset in the process of modernization (Eisenstadt 1968, 32).
15  
In Weber’s writings that touched on Islam, he argues that the characteristic “prebendal 
feudalism,” and “arbitrary bureaucratic patrimonialism” of the Abbasid, Mamluk, and Ottoman 
dynasties, impeded the development of rational, predictable, and evolving legal structures without 
which rational capitalism could not emerge (Turner 1974, 1996; Crone 1999; Schluchter 1999). 
Weber continually contrasts the political and legal institutions existent in the Muslim world to 
their contemporary counterpart institutions of feudal Europe that guaranteed property rights. It 
was primarily this socio-political impediment, not any theological encumbrance, that inhibited the 
rise of capitalism.  
Yet at the level of the individual psyche, Weber also subscribed to the notion that a 
warrior-ethic that emphasized pillage as a means of acquisition was incompatible with the “spirit 
of capitalism,” though numerous commentators have observed that Weber was misguided in 
purely factual terms (cf. Turner 1974, Kuran 1997, Lapidus 1999, Levtzion 1999). Neither did 
Islam encourage counter-striving behavior in areas where Muslims were a minority (such as 
South Asia) nor did dissenting movements within Islam play a similar role to Calvinism in 
encouraging rational mastery of the world.
16 Yet, as Gellner argued, “by various obvious 
criteria—universalism, scripturalism, spiritual egalitarianism, the extension of full participation of 
the sacred community not to one, or some, but to all, and the rationalization of social life—Islam 
                                                 
14 However, he compared the economically successful Jains and Parsees to European Jewry in terms of 
social exclusion and argued that certain Jainist tenets strongly paralleled Quaker and Puritan views (Weber 
1920/1952, 1958). 
15 Eisenstadt (1968, 34) argues that the subsequent failure of India to develop successfully reflects “the 
failure of Hinduism to develop motivational orientations and commitments to the undertaking and 
performance of new secular roles…It was easier, paradoxically enough, for minority Hindu 
groups―mainly abroad―to form such a linkage than it was within India herself.”  
16 On the first point, see Weber (1920/1958), Lewis (1955), and Metcalf (1999).  On the latter point, see 
Cook (1999), Metcalf (1999), and Peters (1999).  Rodinson (1973) argues that there were precisely such 
dynamic minority sects within Islam, and that the writings of Muslim ethicists during the Middle Ages (i.e., 
prior to the rise of capitalism in Europe) reveal a greater affinity toward economic advance than did those 
of their Christian counterparts. Geertz (1956, 1968) and Hagen (1962) describe the role of economically 





is, of the three great Western monotheisms, the one closest to modernity” (Gellner, 1981, 7; 
emphasis in the original).  
  Weber appealed to various kinds of historical data to substantiate his case, for example, 
by using surveys showing the religious affiliations of individuals involved in certain kinds of 
occupations. In light of the limitations of the available statistical materials and contemporary 
methods of statistical analysis, Weber’s case was essentially historical-descriptive in nature.  
 
MEASURING CULTURE  
Advances in research methodologies in the first quarter-century after the Second World War 
allowed modernization theorists to apply more rigorous analysis and more extensive data to the 
broader topic of why economic performance has differed widely across societies more 
generally.
17 These researchers regarded economic development as one facet of a systematic 
process of modernization that among other things would result in a diminution of religion 
institutions, practices, and consciousness per the so-called secularization thesis (cf. Berger 1967, 
Martin 1978), which, ironically, its most prominent proponents would later repudiate (cf. Berger 
1999, Martin 1999).
18 Although much of this work is now regarded as crude, ethnocentric, and 
passé, it nevertheless addressed important issues and may still be of value. 
Prominent in this literature was research conducted mostly by psychologists and 
sociologists reported in McClelland (1961) who sought to measure “need for achievement,” 
understand its determinants, and establish what links, if any, there were to economic 
performance.
19 What they were trying to measure was “the desire to do something better, faster, 
more efficiently, with less effort…It is a very specific, rather rare, drive which focuses on the 
goal of efficiency and which expresses itself in activities available in the culture which permit or 
encourage one to be more efficient; and across cultures the most common form such activity 
                                                 
17 Weber did not use the term “modernization,” which is of relatively recent vintage, and subsequent 
research by the modernization theorists was arguably more influenced by the thinking of his contemporary 
Emile Durkheim, and later, Talcott Parsons.  See Adelman and Morris (1971) for a good survey of this 
literature; also Hoselitz (1960) and Hagen (1962). 
18 “A whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled “secularization theory” is 
essentially mistaken…[the] idea is simple:  Modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in 
society and in the minds of individuals.  And it is precisely this key idea that has turned out to be wrong” 
(Berger 1999, 2-3).  Berger (1999, 2) graciously adds, “As I like to tell my students, one advantage of being 
a social scientist, as against being, say, a philosopher or a theologian, is that you can have as much fun 
when your theories are falsified as when they are verified!” Gellner (1992) argues that the secularization 
thesis is essentially correct with respect to the world’s major religious traditions—with the sole exception 
of Islam. 
19 See Furnham (1990) for a survey of other attempts to psychometric assessments of Protestant work ethic 





takes is business” (McClelland 1976, A-B), similar to the notion of X-efficiency (Leibenstein 
1966).
20 
Implicit in this conception is the notion that there are national cultures—sufficiently 
shared, territorially unique, and persistent or unchanging to be a useful analytical category—and 
that this set of shared values or behavioral tendencies can be scored numerically. Obviously, each 
of these characteristics is subject to challenge, particularly in regard to multi-ethnic states 
(McSweeney 2002). Nevertheless, this notion of national culture, need for achievement, and its 
measurement spawned a vast literature.
21 Researchers used various techniques to measure need 
for achievement, including controlled experiments on individual subjects in Brazil, Germany, 
India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Turkey, and the United States; analysis of the folktales of 45 
preliterate societies for achievement imagery; and analysis of third- and fourth- grade school 
readers for a sample of 23 countries in 1925 and 41 countries in 1950.
22 There is little correlation 
between the 1925 and 1950 measures, which is a puzzle if national cultures exist in any 
meaningful sense, are persistent in character, and are being captured in these kinds of analyses. 
McClelland reported modest support for Weber’s hypothesis regarding the impact of 
Protestantism on the rise of capitalism with regard to differences among achievement orientation 
scores for contemporary Catholic and Protestant populations in North America.
23 Likewise, he 
obtained a positive statistical relationship between the national need-for-achievement scores 
obtained from the children’s readers and subsequent changes in the production of electricity, 
which he took as a proxy for economic growth, though Hofstede (1997, 2001) observes that the 
relationship between need for achievement and per capita income growth did not hold for a later 
sample period.  
More generally, McClelland found that among both the preliterate societies and 
contemporary groups, high need-for-achievement scores were associated with religious practices 
that stressed individual (as distinct from ritualistic) contact with the Divine and a de-emphasis on 
                                                 
20 According to Hofstede, “In choosing the achievement motive, the American McClelland has promoted a 
typical Anglo value complex to a universal recipe for economic success. A Frenchman, Swede, or Japanese 
would have been unlikely to conceive of a worldwide achievement motive. Even the word ‘achievement’ is 
difficult to translate into other languages (Hofstede 1997, 124; emphasis in the original). 
21 Among the more curious applications was done by Bradburn and Burlew (1961), who used various types 
of literature to measure changes in achievement orientation over time in Tudor, England.  Per Greif, 
McClelland also notes, in passing, that literature analysis suggests that the Genoese had a high achievement 
orientation.  Intriguingly, Kennedy (1988) cites a study of Nigerian schoolchildren by LeVine (1966) in 
which the Hausa, which in certain respects are reminiscent of the Maghribi, ranked lowest on need to 
achieve among the three largest ethnic groups. 
22 See McClelland (1961) for details of the methods used in making these measurements. 
23 Rosen (1959) found that North American Jews were distinct in that they were the only group for which 





religious experts or authorities as a necessary adjunct to the performance of religious duties. He 
also reports sociological survey evidence that appears to confirm the casual empiricism of Weber 
and Lewis regarding Quakers and Jains: adherents to some of these religions (e.g., Quakers in the 
United States; Jains, Vaishnava Hindus, and Parsees in India; Zen Buddhists in Japan) are over-
represented among the business elite. He had remarkably little to say about Islam.
24 
Cross-national surveys of individual respondents’ cultural predilections were undertaken 
on a much grander scale as part of an IBM management program over the 1967–73 period 
(Hofstede 1997, 2001). Two rounds of survey questionnaires were administered to 88,000 IBM 
employees in 1967 and 1973. In addition to the demographic control questions, the surveys 
consisted of 60 “core” questions and 66 “recommended” questions; the surveys were conducted 
in 20 languages on IBM employees in 72 countries. Of these, 65 countries had enough 
respondents to warrant analysis at the national level. Subsequently, Hofstede constructed 
estimates for an additional 16 countries. These survey results have served as the springboard for a 
large—and controversial—social psychology literature.
25  
According to Hofstede, statistical analysis of the responses suggested that they could be 
characterized along four dimensions: a power-distance index (“the extent to which the less 
powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that 
power is unequally distributed”); an uncertainty-avoidance index (“the extent to which the 
members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations”); an individualism-
collectivism dimension (“individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals 
are loose…collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated 
into strong, cohesive in-groups…”); and a masculine-feminine dimension (“masculinity stands 
for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct…femininity stands for a society in 
which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and 
concerned with the quality of life”). Hofstede argued that McClelland’s need for achievement was 
strongly correlated with the combination of weak uncertainty avoidance and strong masculinity. 
As a check on the possible cultural bias of the survey, a second survey was designed by 
Chinese social scientists and administered to groups of 100 students (half male, half female) in 23 
                                                 
24 While McClelland had little to say about Islam, he did make another intriguing observation.  
Communism could be regarded as a ecclesiastical and formalistic religion, which would tend toward a 
collectivist mentality in social relations.  However, the need-to-achieve score calculated from USSR 
children’s readers in 1950 was very high, leading McClelland to predict a rise in individualistic attitudes in 
the USSR.  At the same time, the Soviets were consciously disrupting traditional family life by encouraging 
female labor force participation, with the likely effect of further eroding traditional values.  McClelland 
speculated that similar forces might be at work in China, though he had no data on need-to-achieve scores 
in the Chinese case.   





countries. The results of the Chinese-designed survey were mapped to the four dimensions 
reported above, except that there was no counterpart to the uncertainty-avoidance index, and 
instead another response pattern cluster emerged that was labeled the long-term/short-term 
dimension—“the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance 
and thrift; its opposite pole stands for the fostering of virtues related to past and present, in 
particular, respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’ and fulfilling social obligations” (Hofstede 
2001, 359).  
 Hofstede argued that culture precedes religion: religions that fit, not change, pre-existing 
values are adopted. Of the four cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance appears to be most 
meaningfully related to religion. The basic religio-cultural schism is between the revealed-truth 
monotheistic religions (Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam) of high uncertainty-
avoidance cultures and religions of the low uncertainty-avoidance cultures, including Hinduism 
and Buddhism, which tend to emphasize ritual and virtue over indisputable truth. Two exceptions 
stand out: Japan, which scores extremely high on uncertainty avoidance, and the Protestant-
dominated societies that, exceptionally for people of the book, score low on uncertainty 
avoidance. Individualistic societies tend to promote religions that emphasize the individual’s 
relationship with the supernatural; the Protestant-dominated societies score the highest on this 
indicator (and Japan the lowest of any developed country), perhaps explaining their 
exceptionality with respect to uncertainty avoidance and religion.  
The other two cultural dimensions also map to religious predilections. High scores on 
power-distance (i.e., comfort and acceptance of hierarchy) tend to be associated with Catholicism 
relative to Protestantism, and Hinduism relative to Islam. Countries in the Confucian cultural 
zone score high on power-distance, though it is unclear which came first, hierarchical social 
relations or Confucius. 
Additional insight is provided by the final cultural indicator, the masculinity measure, in 
that the cultures with high femininity scores have tended to secularize faster.
26 Verweij, Ester, and 
Nauta (1997), using the World Values Study data, found that Hofstede’s masculinity index was 
statistically significantly correlated with both religiosity and orthodoxy of belief, and went some 
                                                 
26 Hofstede argues that Christianity maintains a dialectic between traditionally masculine and feminine 
values, in its crudest form between the “an-eye-for-an-eye” of the Old Testament and the “turn the other 
cheek” of the New.  Although one can identify exceptions within any broad religious tradition, Catholic 
traditions tend to support masculine values, while Protestant traditions support feminine ones.  Similarly, 
Sunni Islam is a more triumphant, masculine version of Islam than Shia, which emphasizes suffering.  Shia-
dominated Iran scored lower on the masculine-feminine measure than the Sunni-dominated Arab countries.  
Within Buddhism, Japanese Zen Buddhism is a “tougher” variant than that practiced in Thailand.  All of 
these observations could be interpreted as enhancing confidence in the statistical analysis, or as simple ex 





way in explaining “American exceptionalism” with respect to its coincidence of wealth, 
modernity, and a relatively high level of religious orientation. 
What does this have to do with economic performance? Hofstede makes no claim that 
these cultural measures can directly explain economic performance, and indeed, they do not 
appear to be correlated with economic growth rates (Hofstede 2001, exhibit A6.5). To the extent 
that individualism is highly correlated with per capita income, Hofstede argues that it is more 
likely that the causality runs from income to individualism, not the reverse.
27  
However, Hofstede does claim that the long-term orientation indicator causes economic 
performance, for example, by raising the marginal propensity to save, though he admits that like 
McClelland’s earlier result, this may be sample-period specific. In this respect, religions that 
emphasize virtue over truth, such as Hinduism, are associated with high long-term orientation 
scores and could be expected to promote growth. In contrast, Islam appears to be associated with 
very low long-term orientation that could be expected to hamper growth.
28 Nooderhaven and 
Tidjani (2001) report responses derived from a subsequent sampling of African students who 
might be expected to embody values transmitted from pre-Abrahamic religious traditions. They 
make the intriguing observation that survey questions that discriminated between knowledge, 
wisdom, and education, tended to elicit responses in African cultures expressing a preference for 
wisdom and experience over knowledge, reminiscent of Appiah’s (1993) distinction between 
traditional and modern knowledge. These responses are negatively correlated with the share of 
savings in GDP, the marginal propensity to save, and GDP growth at the national level. 
In summary, Hofstede generated a broader set of national cultural indicators. To a 
significant extent they appear to support the content of the interaction of religion and personal 
values first elaborated by Weber. Unlike Weber, McClelland, and others, Hofstede did not claim 
that these are likely to influence economic outcomes (with the exception of the long-term 
orientation measure he claimed affected economic performance at the national level). 
This work is subject to the same questions as McClelland’s regarding the meaningfulness 
of national culture as an analytic category. More specifically, even if national cultures existed, it 
                                                 
27 Hofstede (2001) also predicts that demographic change in the form of aging societies will require the 
more efficient use of female labor and inducing declines in the masculine-feminine cultural dimension--and 
thus providing another example of economic change inducing cultural change.  
28 Yeh and Lawrence (1995) criticized this claim, arguing that the statistical correlation was sensitive to the 






is questionable whether IBM employees would be a representative sample.
29 Moreover, there are 
questions about whether the statistical work that underlies this characterization of the data is 
robust and whether this particular characterization of national culture is replicable in other 
samples.
30 And while Hofstede is more circumspect than McClelland in claiming that cultural 
attributes determine national economic performance, they share the conception, going all the way 
back to Weber, of national economies as aggregations of individuals, largely without reference to 
intermediating institutions. Moreover, the frequent recitation of Quakers and Jains as economic 
model minorities, starting with Weber and running through Lewis, McClelland, Hofstede, and 
others, smacks of casual empiricism. 
Recent economic literature has in certain respects re-ploughed the same ground, much of 
it by making use of the World Values Survey data, but with a more informed notion of the role of 
institutions in intermediating values and affecting outcomes. LaPorta et al. (1997) define 
Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam as “hierarchical” religions (reminiscent of 
Hofstede’s power-distance index), a characterization for which Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2002) find some support in the responses in the World Values Surveys. 
Focusing on the issue of “trust,” reminiscent of Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance 
measure, LaPorta et al. found that “holding per capita income constant, countries with more 
dominant hierarchical religions have less efficient judiciaries, greater corruption, lower-quality 
bureaucracies, higher rates of tax evasion, lower rates of participation in civic activities and 
professional associations, a lower level of importance of large firms in the economy, inferior 
infrastructures, and higher inflation” (LaPorta et al., 1997, 336–37). They did not find a robust 
relationship between hierarchy-dominant religions and infant mortality, educational achievement, 
and growth.  
Extending this work using the World Values Survey data, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
find that a religious upbringing has a negative impact on trust among Catholics, Muslims, and 
Hindus. They also find that with the exception of Buddhism, all of the major world religions 
encourage intolerance if that religion is the dominant one in the country. (Buddhists are also 
unique, according to Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, in that they are the only adherents who do 
not ascribe poverty to laziness.) Again, it is not hard to see some affinity to Hofstede’s distinction 
between the high uncertainty-avoidance revealed-truth monotheistic religions (Catholicism, 
                                                 
29 McSweeney (2002) argues that for several reasons the responses elicited in these surveys are unlikely to 
be representative.  Furthermore while the aggregate sample size is large, for some individual countries the 
sample sizes are small—less than one hundred responses.   
30 On this issue of fragility, see Bond (2002).  For examples of replication, see Triandis and Bontempo 
(1986) and Hoppe (1998) who largely reproduces the complete set of rankings using a sample of 1,500 





Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) and the religions of low uncertainty-avoidance 
cultures. They also find that theology counts: attitudes involving trust and tolerance are 
significantly different among Catholics raised after the Vatican II reforms of 1962. 
In the economic realm, Protestants, Catholics, and Hindus tend to be favorably disposed 
toward private ownership, while Muslims want significantly less private ownership. Protestants 
and Hindus alone accept the trade-off of greater income inequality for more growth, Jews and 
Muslims are opposed, and the results for other religions statistically insignificant.
31 They interpret 
this finding as a vindication of Weber. 
 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
The hypothesis that religious attitudes affect national economic performance is a testable 




1-α where Y is gross domestic product, K is the stock of human and physical capital, L 
is unskilled labor, A is a constant reflecting the technological starting point of each society, and 
µ 
is the exogenous rate of technological change. As written, the aggregate production function is 
Cobb-Douglas with a capital (human and physical) share of α. Rewritten in intensive (i.e., per 
capita) form, the model implies that the growth rate of per capita income will slow over time as 
the marginal product on capital declines, and that in a cross-section, poorer countries (with lower 
capital-labor ratios) will tend to grow more quickly than rich countries, conditional on the saving-
investment rate.  
For some time, economists have been troubled by the fact that the actual growth 
trajectories of national economies seem to contradict both implications of the model. Romer 
(1986), Lucas (1988), Robelo (1991), and others launched the endogenous growth literature that 
sought to explain the first empirical anomaly through various mechanisms that would temper the 
tendency of declining marginal returns to slow the growth rate of rich economies; Barro (1991), 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) set off the now vast 
literature on the determinants of long-run growth across countries and subnational jurisdictions. 
                                                 
31 Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002, 31) also claim a variety of other fascinating results:  “Judaism has 
the strongest negative impact on willingness to cheat on taxes, Protestantism second, Catholicism and 
Hinduism third, and Islam fourth.  The rankings are different when it comes to accepting a bribe.  The 
strongest negative impact comes from Buddhism, with Protestants and Muslims next, and Catholics last. 
Stulz and Williamson (2001) make no distinction between culture and religion at all, simply using religion 
as a proxy for culture.  They obtain the not entirely elucidated result that stock-market development 
depends on legal tradition (common law or civil law), while debt market and banking development depend 
on culture proxies (i.e., dominant religion), with creditor rights and enforcement greater in Protestant-





In addition to the accumulation of physical and human capital, attention has focused on indicators 
of macroeconomic stability, trade openness, political institutions, and geography.
32  
Solow (2001) questioned the role of the many right-hand-side variables that have been 
included in the long-run growth literature and instead argued for focusing on national differences 
in the level and growth of total factor productivity or TFP (i.e., Ae
µt) across countries as the left-
hand-side variable to be explained. The problem, of course, is that empirical estimates of TFP are 
themselves derived as the residuals from growth-accounting exercises, and can be very sensitive 
to assumptions about the underlying aggregate production function (Pack 2001) and the 
measurement of inputs (Hsieh 2002). Setting aside these operational issues, Solow (2001, 287) 
argues that nontechnological phenomena including “the security of contracts, the intensity of 
competition, and the respect for instrumental rationality as a mode of behavior” could have a 
major impact on resource allocation and hence TFP. Solow also takes issue with the implicit 
assumption of much of the empirical work, namely that actual measured output is at or near 
potential, particularly in the case of poor countries, especially monocultural primary producers.
33 
If these kinds of countries are included in the empirical analysis, then droughts and pests should 
be included in the right-hand-side variables. 
 In this spirit, table 1 reports simple correlations among McClelland’s need-to-achieve 
estimate for 1950; Hofstede’s five cultural indicators; the national means of three variables on the 
intensity of religiosity (whether a respondent was raised religiously, whether the respondent 
attends religious services weekly, and whether the respondent believes in God) derived from the 
World Values Survey data; an estimate of TFP growth for 1973–84 by Collins and Bosworth 
(1996); and real per capita income growth between 1970 and 1990 derived from the Penn World 
Tables. See the data appendix for further details. 
The only significant correlation between economic performance and the noneconomic 
variables is a negative correlation at the 10 percent level between the population share raised 
religiously and per capita income growth. McClelland’s need-to-achieve variable is generally 
uncorrelated with any other indicator—the only significant correlation between this variable and 
any other measure, is a negative correlation at the 10 percent level with Hofstede’s long-term 
orientation measure.
34 The religiosity variables are highly correlated with Hofstede’s indices in 
                                                 
32 See Levine and Renelt (1992) as a fine exemplar of this literature.  Among the many commentaries, Pack 
(1994), Durlauf (1996), and Solow (2001) are particularly good. 
33 Kumar and Russell (2002, table 1) suggest that typically countries may be well inside their estimated 
production possibility frontiers. 
34 Because the sample sizes differ across the variables (ranging from 31 to 86), and the country coverage 
varies as well, the actual numbers of observations used to calculate these correlations varies substantially 





some cases. The population share raised religiously is positively correlated with power-distance 
(a measure of comfort with hierarchy) and uncertainty avoidance (a measure of risk avoidance), 
and negatively correlated with individualism. Conversely, the share not believing in God is 
negatively correlated with power-distance and long-term orientation, and positively correlated 
with individualism. The issue is whether any relationship between religion and economic 




A standard model of economic fundamentals is reported in the first two columns of table 2. The 
regressors, defined in the appendix, include initial GDP per capita, investment share, government 
expenditure share, international trade openness, and educational attainment. In addition to these 
included regressors, a long list of other variables were tried but are not reported in the interest of 
parsimony. These include life expectancy, urbanization, and macroeconomic variables including 
measures of inflation and financial development that are highly correlated with the included 
regressors. Political-institutional variables that were tried included Freedom House and Polity IV 
project variables. These measures tended to be either statistically insignificant or not available for 
a substantial sample share (as was the case with the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) 
settler death rate instrument for institutional quality), though as Barro (1999) has shown, there 
may be a nonlinear relationship between religious affiliation and political development, and inter 
alia, economic performance.
35 Geographic and endowment variables tried included an oil exporter 
dummy, a dummy for land-locked countries, and national capital latitude and temperature. Again, 
these did not yield robust results once the core explanatory variables reported in table 2 were 
included. The basic regressions were then analyzed for simultaneity, especially with regard to the 
accumulation of human capital and were re-estimated using instrumental variables estimators.
36 
The null of equality between the coefficients derived from the OLS and 2SLS regressions could 
never be rejected. A summary of these nonreported regressions is available on request. 
                                                                                                                                                 
than lower correlations once differences in sample sizes are taken into account. In particular, the religiosity 
variables are derived from a country sample that has many states of the former Soviet Union and the former 
Yugoslavia that are undefined for the economic performance variables.    
35 The one variable that was consistently significant was expropriation risk, but unfortunately the measure 
is only available for relatively recent sample periods and hence raises basic issues of causality and violating 
exogeneity.   
36 Some Islamic governments have impeded female education. Lindert (2003) found that the presence of a 
“dominant Catholic Church” discouraged primary school education enrollment rates in a sample of 24 





In both regressions 2.1 and 2.2, initial GDP per capita, the starting point indicator, is 
negative and statistically significant—i.e., the countries exhibit convergence conditional on the 
other variables. Similarly, the coefficient on the human capital indicator, average years of 
schooling, is positive and statistically significant in both regressions. One surprise is that trade 
openness (defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP) is insignificant in both regressions, 
presumably reflecting the crudity of this measure.
37 
Cultural and religiosity variables were then added one at a time to regressions 2.1 and 2.2 
(i.e., six cultural variables and three religiosity variables added to two specifications for a total of 
18 regressions). In no case were the cultural or religiosity variables statistically significant, and in 
the interest of brevity these regressions are not reported.
38  
Variables on religious affiliation in 1970 were then added to the standard model in 
regressions 2.3 and 2.4. Seven categories of religious affiliation are distinguished: Catholic, 
Protestant, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists.
39 The original source 
provides data at a finer level of disaggregation, but other religions tend to be either extremely 
small in terms of global membership (e.g., Baha’is), or are so completely concentrated in a single 
country that they act as a dummy for that country (e.g., Shintoism in Japan), or are themselves 
heterogeneous catch-all categories (e.g., ethno-religions). These religions, together with atheists 
and the nonreligious, collectively make up the “other religions” category. They are omitted from 
the regression (i.e., are absorbed in the constant) and are the standard against which the included 
major world religions are judged.
40 
The hypothesis that the coefficients on the religious variables are jointly equal to zero can 
be rejected for both specifications, though in the case of the TFP specification (regression 2.3), 
none of the individual coefficients are statistically significant. In the regression on per capita 
growth rates (regression 2.4), the Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant population shares are 
negatively correlated with per capita income growth, conditional on economic fundamentals. 
(Differences in the underlying country samples and sample periods may have as much to do with 
                                                 
37 It would be desirable to develop a measure that controls for such fundamentals as domestic market size 
and geographic distance from foreign markets, to isolate true variations in openness to trade.  See Frankel 
and Romer (1999) for one such effort.  
38 These results differ from those obtained by Barro and McCleary (2003) who found intensity of belief 
(though not church attendance) positively associated with national economic performance. 
39 Unfortunately, the original source does not differentiate Muslims by sect, and attempts to find consistent 
cross-national data in this regard have been unsuccessful. 
40 Another issue is whether it is religious affiliation or the existence of a “dominant” religion (Lindert 
2003), the degree of religious fragmentation, or state-supported religion (Barro and McCleary 2003) that is 
relevant.  The issue of state support is particularly problematic, as some countries that formally maintain a 
state religion appear to be fairly ecumenical in practice (e.g., Malaysia), while others appear to have in 





the differences in the regression 2.3 and 2.4 results as intrinsic differences in the specification of 
the dependent variables. See the appendix for lists of the country samples.) 
Studentized residuals were generated for all observations. Guyana was the only outlier in 
table 2 with studentized residuals exceeding 2.0 in absolute value in all cases. Among the 
predominately Muslim countries, there was no pattern to the studentized residuals. There were 
occasional outliers (e.g., Jordan’s values exceeded 2.0 in regressions 2.1 and 2.3; Iran’s was less 
than –2.0 in regression 2.3), but there was no consistent pattern of positive or negative residuals, 
and most countries lay near the regression line.  
As a final step, the religion and cultural variables were combined with the economic 
fundamentals. Each of the cultural and religiosity variables was added in turn to the regression 




Typically, the national religious affiliation data change slowly as a function of differential birth 
rates among different groups, in- and out-migration, and conversion, with some notable 
exceptions: in South Korea, for example, the Christian share rose from less than 1 percent in 1900 
to 18 percent in 1970 and 40 percent in 1990. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, Christianity and 
Islam have made steady in-roads, eroding the ethno-religious share for centuries. In the 
regressions reported thus far, the sample period was determined by the availability of data. In the 
case of the TFP regressions, this was determined by the existence of estimates for a considerable 
sample of countries for 1973–84. For per capita income growth, the sample period 1970–90 was 
essentially chosen as the optimal trade-off between maximizing the sample period and 
maximizing the cross-national sample size, especially for heavily Muslim countries for which the 
data pre-1970 are sparse. Indeed, one of the basic issues is how something as slowly changing as 
religious affiliation could explain variable national economic performance.
41 
  The table 2 regressions were re-estimated for the 1913–98 period using per capita income 
data on 31 countries from Maddison (2001). Unfortunately, the country sample consists mainly of 
countries that escaped colonization during the 20
th century, and there are no predominately 
Muslim countries in this sample. In the absence of the conventional macroeconomic variables, the 
following regressors were assembled: Nobel Prize winners per capita prior to 1913, the Polity IV 
composite score of democracy and autocracy in 1913, national capital temperature and latitude, 
the 1900 urbanization rate, the landlocked dummy, and religious affiliation in 1900. Of the 
                                                 





nonreligious explanators, only initial GDP per capita, polity, and latitude were ever statistically 
significant, and only initial per capita income and latitude were robust to changes in specification. 
Four specifications are reported in table 3. Initial per capita income is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level in all four cases. Latitude is significant once polity or the Nobel 
Prize winners per capita is excluded. In regressions 3.3 and 3.4, the religious affiliation variables 
are added. The F-test on their inclusion is significant at the 5 percent level in both cases. The 
coefficient on Buddhism is significant in both regressions due to the concentration of Buddhists 
in Japan, China, and Thailand. In regression 3.4, the coefficient on the Jewish share is negative at 
the 10 percent level, due to Hungary acting as an influential observation; it disappears if Hungary 
is excluded from the sample. No country had studentized residuals with absolute values 
exceeding 2.0 in all four specifications, though Hungary did in three of four cases. 
 
IS ISLAM A DRAG ON GROWTH? 
Today Muslims are relatively poor, whether the comparison is done to the worldwide mean at 
either the individual (Bhalla 2002) or national (Kuran 1997) level, and there is a long line of 
scholarship that ascribes this state of affairs to Islam itself.
42 (Of course there is also a literature 
that lays the blame at the feet of Western imperialism [cf. Rodinson 1973, Ayubi 1993].) In 
principle, the existence of uniquely Islamic economic practices or institutions (most prominently 
the Koranic prohibition on interest) provides the institutional link between religious affiliation 
and economic performance at the aggregate level.
43 On the basis of their analysis of World 
Values Survey data, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002) characterize Islam as being negatively 
associated “with attitudes that are conducive to growth” and, among adherents to the world’s 
major religions, Muslims as being the most “antimarket,” though these assessments do not appear 
to be borne out in tables 2 and 3.  
Yet if it is adherence to Islam that is driving macroeconomic outcomes, then this is a 
puzzle: the conventional wisdom is that the Islamic world was more highly developed than 
Western Europe in the 10
th century; that the West had caught up by roughly the 17
th or 18
th 
centuries, hence Western Europe was advancing faster than the Islamic world in the interim. This 
means that Islam is consistent with long periods of both relatively rapid and slow growth. It also 
                                                 
42 See Said (1978), Kuran (1997), and Nafissi (1998) for discussion. The basic argument is that Islam 
preaches fatalism which is inimical to growth; of course, the Koran, like other religious texts is open-ended 
and subject to interpretation, and as Rodinson (1973) and Kuran (1997) point out there are also verses that 
encourage enrichment.     
43 See Siddiqi (1981) and Kuran (1992) for surveys of Islamic economic institutions and thought.  Rodinson 
(1973) and Kuran (1993, 2003a) argue that in reality, uniquely Islamic economic practices and institutions 





means that whatever the sins of Western imperialists, Islam was developing more slowly than the 
West during a period of Islamic conquest and geographical expansion into Europe. 
There are at least three potential explanations—one emphasizing intellectual roots, one 
sociological, and one institutional. Regarding the first, what is needed is a theological break 
similar to the Protestant Reformation, which could alter behavior and provide the turning point 
between long periods of relatively successful and unsuccessful development. Lewis (1982) argues 
that somewhere between the 9th and 11th centuries, “the gate of ijtihad” (independent reasoning) 
was closed—meaning that all answers were already available, hence there was no need for 
inquiry, just follow and obey.
44 Traditional Muslim education systems taught a finite set of 
information rather than how to “use their own judgment, exercise their critical faculties, and 
decide things for themselves” (Lewis, 1993, 354)―reminiscent of McClelland’s distinction 
between formalistic and inner-directed religions. In Weber’s view, neither Sufism nor Shi’ism, 
the most prominent departures from the orthodoxy, could provide the basis for a rigorous ascetic 
critique of the dominant practices a la Protestant Christianity.
45 
With regard to the sociological origins of Islamic performance, Weber, following the 
writings of 14
th century Islamic writer Ibn Khaldun, argued that Muslim societies were founded 
by nomadic warriors whose bands were characterized by intense group loyalty—once they settled 
down, however, their descendents succumbed to the vices of the cities and were replaced by 
another wave of tribesmen of greater social cohesion, an interpretation that oddly echoes 
McClelland’s argument about low achievement motivation among the upper classes of socially 
immobile, especially slave-holding, societies. Neither the warrior tradition with its plunder ethic 
nor the sedentarized dynastic bureaucracy could provide the cultural rationale for development 
through intensive means. 
In an institutional analysis complementary to those of Greif and Lal, Kuran (2002) 
provides an interpretation of how Islamic practices, for example inheritance rules, inhibited the 
development of commercial institutions comparable to those developed in the West during the 
Renaissance, and as a consequence disadvantaged Islamic merchants in competition with their 
Western counterparts. Indeed, Kuran (2002, 2003b) argues that these institutional constraints 
explain why commerce within the Middle East came to be increasingly dominated by non-
                                                 
44 Lewis (1993) expands upon this critique of “the authoritarian character of traditional pedagogy” and its 
emphasis on rote memorization.  Of course, authoritarian pedagogy and rote memorization are not unique 
to the schools of Islamic countries, as any Japanese or Korean schoolchild could attest. Ayubi  (1993) 
accepts Lewis’ interpretation of the closing of the gate of ijtihad but argues that it was reopened in the 19
th 
century by the emergence of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and his disciples. See also Lal (1998) for discussion. 
45 See Turner (1974), Metcalf (1999), and Peters (1999) for discussions of the superficial similarities 
between the 19





Muslim religious minorities until the widespread adoption of Western institutions and practices in 
the 19
th century.  
All of these lines of argumentation could be used to rationalize the relative economic 
underperformance of Islamic societies over long periods. As an empirical matter, it is less clear 
whether Muslim countries have in fact underperformed relative to similarly situated comparators 
over the past 50 years or so. Data on per capita income is sketchy, but Barlow’s (1982) attempt to 
construct consistent time-series for the 1950–72 period suggests that, if anything, the Islamic 
countries of the Middle East exhibited slightly more rapid growth than comparable developing 
countries over this period. TFP estimates by Collins and Bosworth imply that over the 1960–73 
period (i.e., before the run-up in oil prices), Islamic countries achieved faster TFP growth rates 
than did other developing countries, though their TFP growth rate turned negative after 1973 (i.e., 
after the first oil shock and the possible onset of Dutch disease and other problems). Similarly, 
while the results reported in tables 2 and 3 do not yield robust results for the relationship between 
religious affiliation and national economic performance, if anything, the relationship between 
Islam and growth appears positive. 
The first two columns of table 4 report regressions of the standard model, with the 
Muslim share and a dummy variable for oil exporters added. The coefficient on the Muslim share 
variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the TFP regression 4.1—a one 
percentage point increase in the share of the population professing Islam is associated with a 
0.02-0.03 percentage point increase in TFP growth. The Muslim share is insignificant in the 
regression on per capita income growth (4.2), consistent with the result obtained in tables 2 and 3. 
This result holds even if one uses simultaneous equation estimators to control for any possible 
negative influence of Islam on human and physical capital accumulation.  
Islam, like other religions, is open-ended, subject to interpretation, and widely varying in 
practice across both the dimensions of time and distance. Much of the argumentation discussed 
thus far relates to developments in the Middle East, and the category “Muslim” may be too broad 
to be analytically meaningful (cf. Zubaida 1995). Not all Muslims are alike; in particular, other 
cultural influences in non-Arab Muslim societies (such as through the Chinese in Southeast Asia 
or the French in West Africa) may attenuate the impact of Middle Eastern traditions. 
To investigate this possibility, the Muslim population share of each country was weighted 
by dividing by the distance between the national capital and Mecca (i.e., the weighted Muslim 
share declines with distance).
46 In these regressions, the inverse distance weighted Muslim share 
                                                 
46 In a future version of this paper, other weighting schemes such as the log distance, distance squared, or 





is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in the TFP regression (4.3) and insignificant in the 
per capita income growth regression (4.4).  
Along similar lines what is at issue are characteristics misattributed to Islam that are 
actually features of Arab culture.
47 Regressions 4.5 and 4.6 report regressions in which the Arab 
population share is added to the model, and for the sake of completeness, regressions 4.7 and 4.8 
report the results with the inverse distance Arab population share. In all four cases, the relevant 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
An examination of the residuals revealed that once again Guyana was the only outlier. 
Among the predominately Muslim countries, studentized residuals exceeding 2.0 in absolute 
value were relatively rare: only Indonesia in regression 4.8 (2.01) and Iran in regressions 4.1  
(–2.67) and 4.3 (–3.15). These results provide no support for the notion that Islam is a drag on 
growth—if anything, the results in table 4 reinforce the notion that the impact of Islam is positive.  
 
ANALYSIS ON SUBNATIONAL DATA 
The cross-national results reported thus far are suggestive but are subject to distortion arising 
from the inability to adequately control for country-specific economic, political, and institutional 
influences. Many economic phenomena that vary across countries such as differences in inflation 
rates, trade policies, or judicial practices can be ignored when examining developments within a 
single country using data on subnational jurisdictions. So the analysis is extended to the single-
country level using data from three multi-ethnic societies with substantial Muslim populations—
India, Malaysia, and Ghana—with the aim of providing a check on the cross-national results. The 
countries were selected on the basis of the availability of subnational data and the existence of 
significant Muslim and non-Muslim populations. 
 
India 
India has the world’s third largest Muslim population, following Indonesia and Pakistan. The 
geographic dispersion of this population across 32 Indian states and union territories is shown in 
figure 1. Table 5 reports regressions of economic and religious affiliation variables on state-level 
data. In regression 5.1, the dependent variable is TFP growth derived from Fan, Hazell, and 
                                                 
47 Lal, for example, writes “But there are important instances (post-Ataturk Turkey, modern Egypt, and, 
most important, major outposts of Islam in Southeast Asia, Malaysia, and Indonesia) that show that it is not 
Islamic beliefs in themselves that have hindered development but dysfunctional étatism and dirigisme, 
which, when reversed in the Muslim parts of Southeast Asia, have delivered Promethean intensive growth” 





Thorat (1999). That source reports TFP estimates for 17 “heavily agricultural” states.
48 The 
growth rates of TFP were calculated for 1973–83 and 1983–93 and the observations stacked, with 
a dummy for the first sample period included to allow the intercept to vary.
49 The regressions 
were estimated with 1971 (1981) values of the initial level of TFP, female literacy rate, state 
development expenditures per capita, population density, percentage of villages with electricity, 
road density, a quadratic function of annual rainfall, and a landlocked state dummy.
50 All except 
the initial level of TFP, female literacy, and state development expenditures per capita were 
insignificant.
51 The Indian census data break down religious affiliation by Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, and Jain shares, with other religions (mostly indigenous animistic 
religions) broken out for the 1981 sample, but not the 1971 sample. (No religion/not reported is 
the omitted share in the regressions). The results for regression 5.1 show that the hypothesis that 
the coefficients on the religion variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected at the 5 percent 
level, none of the coefficients on individual religious affiliation variables, including the Muslim 
share, are statistically significant. 
  In regression 5.2, real per capita income growth in 1981–96 is regressed against the initial 
income level, female literacy, and the religion variables.
52 In this case, the coefficients on three of 
the religious-affiliation variables (Buddhist, Jain, and Other) are positive and significant at the 5 
percent level, and the coefficients on the religious affiliation variables are jointly significant at the 




The population of Malaysia consists largely of three ethnic groups: indigenous Malays or 
bumiputra, Chinese, and Indians, and there is a high correlation between ethnicity and religious 
                                                 
48 The TFP data is available for Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil 
Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.  Data on explanatory variables are missing for Jammu and Kashmir 
and Assam, yielding 15 usable cross-sectional observations and a panel of 30 observations. 
49 A number of sample observations were lost due to missing data for some of the variables. 
50 The female literacy rate fit the data better than did the male literacy rate or the overall literacy rate.  Since 
according to Schultz (1995) there are reasons to believe that female literacy has an especially positive 
impact on development, the regressions with female literacy are reported.  
51 Future work will also utilize state-level data on caste and so-called scheduled tribes. 
52 The Indian census reports data for 30 states.  In regression 5.2, per capita income growth is missing for 
Lakshadweep, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli.  Religious affiliation data is missing for Assam. 
53 The coefficient on the Jain share in particular is quite large—a one percentage point increase in the Jain 
share of the population would be associated with a 1.49 percentage point increase in the real per capita 
growth rate.   Since Jains only make up 0.5 percent of the population this is probably the wrong increment 
to consider.  Suppose, however, that the Jain population were to double as a percentage of India’s 
population.  The results reported in regression 5.2 indicate that this would generate a 0.75 percentage point 





affiliation (table 6). Islam is the official state religion, though the freedom to practice other 
religions is guaranteed under the constitution.
54 The distribution of Muslims across 13 Malaysian 
states and two federal territories is shown in figure 2.  
  Table 7 reports regressions for real per capita income growth in 1990-2000.
55 In 
regression 7.1, population density and juvenile delinquency, a proxy for the absence of  “law and 
order,” are both statistically significant.  The initial income level is not negative and significant 
(i.e. the Malaysian states do not exhibit convergence). Regression 7.2 reports a regression of 
ethnicity in 1990 on per capita income growth. None of the coefficients are individually 
significant, including the coefficient on the bumiputra share, despite the introduction of 
affirmative action style policies to promote bumiputra economic interests.  The ethnicity 
coefficients are jointly significant at the five percent level. In regression 7.3 that combines the 
fundamentals with the ethnicity variables, there are only a handful of degrees of freedom, and 
nothing is significant.  There is some evidence that the inclusion of the state of Sabah (one of the 
two states on Borneo in East Malaysia) exerts a significant influence on the results:  if Sabah is 
excluded from the regression, the coefficients on population density and juvenile delinquency in 
regression 7.1 become insignificant.  
Table 8 reports regressions of religious affiliation on growth. Regression 8.1 reports a 
regression of religious affiliation in 2000 (the first census for which it was reported on the 
subnational level) on per capita income growth, relative to an omitted category consisting of 
tribal/folk religions, other religion, no religion, and unknown religion. The coefficients on the 
Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist shares are negative and statistically significant relative to 
this excluded category. Regression 8.2 combines the economic fundamentals with the religious 
affiliation variables. The coefficients on the Muslim and Buddhist shares are again negative and 
significant, though the interpretation of the religious affiliation results is problematic—logically 
the pattern of religious affiliation in 2000 cannot cause differences in cross-state growth 
performance starting at an earlier date (i.e., the right-hand side variables violate exogeneity). 
As demonstrated in table 6, there is a high degree of correlation between religion and 
ethnicity, and the ethnicity data was used to construct instruments for religion by regressing the 
ethnicity shares in 2000 on religious affiliation in 2000 and then using the estimated regression 
coefficients and the ethnicity data from 1990 to construct fitted values for the missing 1990 
                                                 
54 See Jomo (1992) on the possible relationship between Islam and economic development in Malaysia. 
55 The number of observations vary across the regressions due to some missing data—data on ethnicity, 
juvenile delinquency, and population density are unavailable for the Labuan federal territory; ethnicity data 





religion data. These instrumental variable regressions are reported in table 8 as regressions 8.3 
and 8.4. None of the variables is statistically significant.  
  
Ghana 
Like India and Malaysia, Ghana is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country with a significant 
Muslim population. Both Islam and Christianity have made considerable inroads over the last 
century, with the share of the population to traditional animistic religions falling from 
approximately 90 percent of the population in 1900 to around 20 percent today. The Muslim 
population shares across ten regions are shown in figure 3. Anthropological studies summarized 
in Last (1979) and Kennedy (1988) indicate that conversion to the Abrahamic faiths has 
sometimes been associated with behavioral changes such as greater entrepreneurship and the 
establishment of modern business enterprises. 
  Data on per capita income levels for Ghana’s ten regions were constructed from 
household surveys conducted in 1988, 1992, and 1998.
56 In addition to income, these surveys 
were used to construct data at the regional level on such attributes as years of schooling, ethnicity, 
religious affiliation, population density, time spent fetching water and wood, and distance to 
water source. Monthly data on average and extreme temperatures and precipitation are also 
available at the regional level through the Ghana Meteorological Services Department. Given 
environmental differences between coastal southern Ghana and the northern savannah, data on 
regional capital latitude were collected, and a landlocked regional dummy was constructed. 
  Calculation of simple correlation coefficients revealed statistically significant positive 
correlations between regional growth and years of schooling (with female years of schooling 
slightly more highly correlated with growth than male schooling); latitude; regional variance in 
rainfall; the Protestant population share; and the population shares of two ethnic groups, the 
Hausa and the Akan. (The Hausa are almost exclusively Muslim while the Akan are 
predominately Christian.) Growth was negatively correlated with the animist population share 
and a catch-all “other” ethnic classification. Regional growth was not statistically significantly 
correlated with the initial level of per capita income. The infrastructural development indicators 
(time spent fetching water and wood and distance to water) were highly correlated with the 
regional level of per capita income but not with regional growth. 
  These simple correlations are largely borne out by the regressions stacked panel data 
reported in table 9. Regression 9.1 reports a regression of initial per capita income, average 
                                                 
56 A survey for 1987 also exists but contains such peculiarities in the responses as to render the data 





female years of schooling, population density, latitude, and religious affiliation on regional per 
capita income growth. (The infrastructural and meteorological variables were never statistically 
significant in the regressions and these results are not reported.) Regional income converges, 
conditional on female schooling, regional population density, and latitude. The coefficient on the 
Muslim share is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.
57 (The animist share is the omitted 
category.) The coefficients on Christian population shares are insignificant, regardless of whether 
the Christians are distinguished by denomination (not reported) or grouped together (9.1). 
  The population shares of two ethnic groups (one almost entirely Muslim, the other mainly 
Christian) were positively correlated with regional income growth. The regression is re-estimated 
in 9.2, with ethnicity replacing religious affiliation. (The “other” ethnicity is the omitted 
category.) Neither the coefficient on the Hausa nor Akan share is statistically significant, though 
the coefficient for the Dagbanis, an ethnic group not known for particular commercial acumen, is. 
The F-test on the joint significance of the ethnic affiliation coefficients cannot reject the 
hypothesis of no influence.  
  Taken together, the results from the three country cases tend to reinforce the results 
obtained from the cross-national analysis: religious affiliation does not appear to have a robust 
impact on economic performance once conventional economic fundamentals are taken into 
account. To the extent that any statistically significant results are obtained for the impact of 
Islam, the effect appears to be positive.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has investigated the relationship between religion, culture, and economic performance. 
The theoretical literature is indeterminate. Empirically, accepting the problematic nature of 
national culture as a concept, statistically at least, there are correlations between religious 
affiliation, the intensity of religious belief, and indicators of cultural tendencies. However, the 
national cultural measures have no explanatory power with respect to national economic 
performance once conventional economic fundamentals are taken into account.  
In contrast, in both cross-country and within-country regressions, the null hypothesis that 
religious affiliation is uncorrelated with performance can frequently be rejected, though the 
regressions do not yield a robust pattern of coefficients with respect to particular religions.  
Some commentators have claimed that Islam is inimical to growth. In general this is not 
borne out by the econometric analysis either at the cross-country or within-country level. 
                                                 
57 As in the cross-national case, this result is obtained even if simultaneous equation estimators are used to 





Predominately Muslim countries are seldom outliers (either positively or negatively) in the cross-
country regressions. In most cases, the coefficient on the Muslim population share is statistically 
insignificant. With one exception, where it is significant, it is always positive. The only case of a 
statistically significant negative coefficient is in the sub-national regression for Malaysia. Islam 
does not appear to be a drag on growth or an anchor on development as alleged. If anything, the 
opposite appears to be true. If one is concerned about economic performance in predominately 
Muslim regions or countries, conventional economic analysis may yield greater insight than the 






The cross-country data on religion have been taken from the World Christian Encyclopedia 2
nd 
edition (Barret, Kurian, and Johnson, eds.). Per capita income, government share of GDP, 
investment share of GDP, and openness data came from the Penn World Tables Mark 6.1. Per 
capita income growth, government share of GDP, and investment share of GDP are in current 
international dollars. Initial per capita income is in constant prices (chain series). Education data 
have been obtained from the Barro-Lee "International Measures of Schooling Years and 
Schooling Quality" dataset available on the World Bank's website. As noted in the text, the cross-
country TFP estimates were originally constructed by Collins and Bosworth (1996) but are 
actually published in Rodrik (1999).  
  The data for the power, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term 
orientation variables have been obtained from Hofstede (2001). Data on achievement was taken 
from McClelland (1961). Church attendance, belief in god, and religious upbringing data were 
taken from Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2002). Data on political institutions were found in the 
Polity IV Project dataset (2000).  
Urbanization data were obtained from “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 
Revision” (United Nations 2002). Temperature and latitude data were taken from 
www.worldclimate.com and, in some cases for the latter, were estimated by visual inspection of a 
map. Nobel Prize data was calculated from www.nobel.se.  
   Distance to Mecca was calculated from each country's capital using latitude and 
longitude. The Arab share of population is calculated from data in the World Christian 
Encyclopedia 2
nd edition, volume 2 (Barret, Kurian and Johnson, eds.).  
  Long-run cross-country data on per capita GDP were taken from Maddison (2001). 
Population and religion data for 1900 were taken from the World Christian Encyclopedia 2
nd 
edition (Barret, Kurian, and Johnson, eds.). Urbanization data for 1900 were calculated from 
Chandler and Fox (1974). 
Indian data on per capita GDP, population density, female literacy rates, and religion 
were taken from the Statistical Abstract of India (various years). Data on state TFP levels, village 
electrification, road density, and development expenditures were obtained from "Government 
Spending, Growth and Poverty," Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1998). The authors also kindly 
provided the data on annual rainfall.  
Malaysian data on state per capita GDP, population density, religion and ethnicity for 
2000 were acquired from the "Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics" 





school enrollment, juvenile delinquents, population density, and ethnicity were taken from the 
"General Report on the Population Census” (various years), also produced by the Department of 
Statistics, Malaysia. 
  As described in the text, the data for Ghana are derived from the Ghana Living Standards 
Surveys, with the exception of the meteorological data that were obtained from the Ghana 
Meteorological Services Department.  
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Less than 5 percent Muslim
n.a.
 Figure 2 Religious affiliation in Malaysia, 2000
a







 Figure 3 Religious affiliation in Ghana, 1992
10-20 percent Muslim
Less than 10 percent Muslim
20-30 percent Muslim
Over 50 percent Muslim





























Per Capita GDP Growth  0.75
a
1970-1990, n=86
Need to Achieve,  0.35 -0.04 --
circa 1950, n=34
Power Distance Index,  0.07 -0.03 0.05 --
circa 1970, n=52
-0.14 -0.21 0.05 0.20 --
-0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.66
a -0.24
c --
-0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.18 0.05 -0.01 --
0.25 0.19 -0.38
c 0.34





a 0.29 -0.23 --
0.48 -0.07 0.27 0.31 0.01 -0.25 0.41
b -0.10 0.60
a --
0.05 0.28 -0.33 0.40
b -0.26 0.53 -0.51 0.03 -0.71
a -0.69
a --
Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the 5 percent level; and c at the 10 percent level.
Masculine-Feminine Index, circa 1970, 
n=52
Uncertainty Avoidance Index, circa 
1970, n=52
Table 1:  Simple Correlations between Economic and Cultural Variables
Raised Religiously, 1981-1997 n=31
Attends Religious Services at Least 
Once a Week, 1981-1997 n=31
Does Not Believe in God, 1981-1997 
n=31
Long-term Orientation Index, circa 
1980, n=33
Individualism-Collectivism Index, circa 
1970, n=52(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Independent Variables TFP 73-84 Growth 70-90 TFP 73-84 Growth 70-90










Government share -0.02437 -0.0223 -0.04991 -0.01898
(-0.56) (-0.91) (-1.06) (-0.75)
Openness -0.0098 -0.00468 -0.01267 -0.00442
(-0.93) (-0.66) (-1.24) (-0.63)






Muslim - - 0.00549 -0.00876
(0.34) (-0.78)
Hindu - - 0.01865 0.00444
(0.75) (0.23)
Buddhist - - -0.01031 -0.00901
(-0.41) (-0.48)
Jewish - - -0.00469 -0.04356
(-0.14) (-1.75)
c
Catholic - - -0.01817 -0.02722
(-1.17) (-2.58)
b
Orthodox - - 0.03472 -0.02276
(1.33) (-1.38)
Protestant - - -0.03292 -0.0376
(-1.29) (-2.62)
b
Constant -0.6336 0.59961 0.61806 1.89688
(-0.64) (0.88) (0.35) (1.69)
c
R
2 0.16 0.27 0.40 0.43




F(religion vars only) - - 2.21
c 2.51
b
n 5 07 85 0 7 8
Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the
          5 percent level; and c at the 10 percent level.
Dependent Variables
Table 2: Economic and Religious Variables(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4)
Independent Variables Growth 1913-98 Growth 1913-98 Growth 1913-98 Growth 1913-98






Polity 0.01462 - 0.00818 -
(0.72) (0.29)




Nobels per capita, 1901-1912 380741.7025 - -100830.5515 -
(0.76) (-0.17)
Muslim - - -0.02195 -0.02489
(-0.15) (-0.18)
Hindu - - -0.79462 -0.75775
(-1.46) (-1.47)




Jewish - - -0.08713 -0.10036
(-0.99) (-1.72)
c
Catholic - - 0.00703 0.00687
(0.85) (0.88)
Orthodox - - 0.01378 0.01537
(0.77) (0.98)
Protestant - - 0.00892 0.00862
(1.01) (1.11)






2 0.29 0.26 0.65 0.65





F(religion vars only) - - 2.82
b 3.25
b
n 3 13 13 13 1
Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the
          5 percent level; and c at the 10 percent level.
Dependent Variables
Table 3: Long-Run Economic and Religious Variables(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8)





























Government share -0.04349 -0.02462 -0.0696 -0.033 -0.0755 -0.03893 -0.10314 -0.04211
(-1.00) (-1.01) (-1.42) (-1.31) (-1.59) (-1.52) (-2.00)
c (-1.58)
Openness -0.01059 -0.00366 -0.01044 -0.00314 -0.01037 -0.0036 -0.01122 -0.00352
(-1.03) (-0.52) (-1.00) (-0.44) (-1.02) (-0.51) (-1.11) (-0.50)















c (1.52) - - - -








Net Oil Exporter 0.21009 0.16311 0.38057 0.21911 0.21006 0.07476 0.52602 0.23152
(0.25) (0.28) (0.45) (0.38) (0.25) (0.13) (0.65) (0.40)
Constant -1.21004 0.14685 -0.58206 0.41315 -0.22503 0.66794 0.20015 0.73615
(-1.22) (0.20) (-0.59) (0.60) (-0.23) (0.97) (0.19) (1.05)
R
2 0.24 0.30 0.23 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.28 0.31








n 5 07 85 07 8 5 0 7 8 5 0 7 8
Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the 5 percent level; and c at the
         10 percent level.
Dependent Variables
Table 4: Muslim and Arab Regressions(5.1) (5.2)
Independent Variables TFP 73-93 Growth 81-96
Initial TFP Level -0.05999 -
(-2.00)
c
Initial GDP per capita - -0.00582
(-2.02)
c




Development Expenditures -0.0859 -
    per capita (-3.50)
a
Decade 73-83 dummy -2.60826 -
(-1.73)
c
Hindu Share 0.10566 0.03612
(0.12) (0.82)
Muslim Share 0.00471 -0.07112
(0.01) (-0.95)
Christian Share -0.3539 0.04189
(-0.40) (0.94)
Sikh Share 0.18992 0.05912
(0.22) (1.15)
Buddhist Share 0.67502 0.17479
(0.66) (2.25)
b
Jain Share -1.07947 1.49234
(-1.23) (2.29)
b







F (all explanatory vars) 3.41
a 3.29
b
F(religion vars only) 3.37
b 3.68
a
n3 0 2 6
Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the 5 percent level; and c at the
         10 percent level.
  Dependent Variables

































Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the 5 percent level; 
         and c at the 10 percent level.








Initial GDP per capita* 0.04404 - -0.00595
(0.04) (-0.01)
School enrollment* 3.39833 - -2.60131
(0.47) (-0.4)
Juvenile delinquency* -2.89451 - -1.34833
(-2.16)
c (-1.02)
Population density* 1.1193 - 0.32594
(3.78)
a (1.03)
Bumiputra - -0.22305 -0.24833
(-0.71) (-0.39)
Chinese - -0.1741 -0.2121
(-0.56) (-0.33)
Indians - -0.20342 -0.18287
(-0.66) (-0.31)
Constant -29.00088 23.72559 30.61908
(-0.86) (0.77) (0.39)
R
2 0.62 0.61 0.72
F (all explanatory vars) 3.64
b 4.63
b 1.83
F (ethnicity vars only) - - 1.66
n 1 41 31 3
Note:  Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the 5 percent level; and c at the
         10 percent level.
* Variable specified in natural logs
                      Dependent variables
Table 7 Malaysian regressions on ethnicity(8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4)
(IV Estimation) (IV Estimation)
Independent variables Growth 1990-2000 Growth 1990-2000 Growth 1990-2000 Growth 1990-2000
Initial GDP per capita* - 0.09901 - 0.02382
(0.12) (0.03)
School enrollment* - 0.92202 - 2.24213
(0.14) (0.23)
Juvenile delinquency* - -2.68143 - 0.3039
(-1.55) (0.15)
Population density* - 1.06262 - 0.02385
(1.66) (0.06)








Hinduism -0.46729 -0.24363 38.69487 38.2994
(-2.83)
b (-1.05) (1.56) (0.51)




Confucianism -0.34973 -0.19037 83.12802 82.74259
(-1.57) (-0.73) (1.53) (0.5)
Constant 44.30398 19.21894 2222.91966 2199.73974
(3.12)
b (0.54) (1.6) (0.52)
R
2 0.85 0.91 0.84 0.85




F(religion vars only) 8.78
a 2.69 7.49
a 1.65
n1 4 1 4 1 3 1 3
Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the 5 percent level; and c at the
     10 percent level.
* = Variable specified in natural logs.
Table 8  Malaysian regressions on religion(9.1) (9.2)
Independent Variables














































n2 0 2 0
Note: Superscript a indicates significance at the 1 percent level; b at the 5 percent level; and c at the
         10 percent level.
Table 9: Ghanaian Regressions of Regional Per Capita Income Growth on Religion and Ethnicity